The al-Sadr/al-Hakim pact: A New Era in Iraqi Shiite Politics?
October 31, 2007 Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Shiite Militiamen in Iraqi Army and Police, Mahdi Army, Iraq No CommentsThe Jamestown Foundation, 10/29/2007
By Babak Rahimi (from Terrorism Monitor, October 25) -
The recent “pact of honor” made by two of Iraq’s most influential Shiite clerics, Moqtada al-Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim—aimed at preventing violence and helping to maintain the “Islamic and national interest” of Iraq—appears to signal a significant shift toward stability in Iraq. The two leaders have pledged to enhance relations between their respective groups, merging media and cultural projects, and to refrain from launching negative propaganda against each other (Fars News Agency, October 6). Yet, more importantly, the pact calls for promotion of the legal-political order of post-Baathist Iraq, a major move that could give new life to Nuri al-Maliki’s government and curtail potential violence in the south. As the first official agreement between these two prominent leaders, the forged pact can also be recognized as a huge step in improving intra-Shiite relations. Not since the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance, which brought together a number of Shiite political parties under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2003, has Shiite politics seen such a unified front. The struggle for domination between rival Shiite groups has caused huge problems in the south, especially after the December 2005 elections. Despite a number of attempts for reconciliation, the enmity between al-Hakim and al-Sadr and their militias has remained a major security problem, especially in the provinces of Basra and Maysan, where the two factions are vying for control over oil and territory.
Disagreements only intensified after the British withdrawal from Basra in early September, causing trouble for an already unstable Iraqi government seeking reconciliation over major political issues such as federalism and the distribution of oil. Seen in such a context, this new deal is made at a time when the “surge” strategy has gradually shown signs of relative military success in places like the eastern and central provinces, where al-Qaeda forces continue to lose the support of Sunni Iraqis. Yet, one important question remains to be answered: does the new pact promise any significant improvement in the country’s political situation at such a crucial stage in its history?


