Religion, Nationalism, and Terror

U.S. envoy warns of growing power of Iraqi militias, Reuters, October 25, 2007

Ambassador Ryan Crocker said the new U.S. “surge” strategy, which saw 30,000 extra troops sent to Iraq, had significantly reduced sectarian violence in Baghdad, the former al Qaeda stronghold of Anbar province and elsewhere.

“Al Qaeda in Iraq has shown extraordinary persistence but clearly their abilities have been badly damaged. In a sense that puts into highlight the other big problem, which is the militias, particularly JAM,” he told journalists in Baghdad.

JAM is the acronym for the Jaish al-Mehdi, otherwise known as the Mehdi Army, the feared militia force commanded by Moqtada al-Sadr. The cleric ordered a ceasefire in August so that he could reorganize the militia, which has splintered into factions, many of which are believed to be beyond his control.

“We have seen JAM Militant transform into JAM Incorporated. They may not be shooting at us or Iraqi soldiers, but (they are) controlling gas stations, real estate, trade and services,” Crocker said.

“That is a major challenge to the state and it would be a difficult problem to tackle but one that has to be.”

Ackerman, The Problem with Militias | The American Prospect, November 13, 2007

Perceiving the United States’ receptivity to Sunnis who declare themselves against AQI, whose number has always been miniscule compared to the indigenous Sunni insurgency, the Sunnis have built a massive constellation of militias in the past few months with U.S. support. Known as “Concerned Local Citizens” — “militia” being a taboo term — the U.S. military totals the number of militiamen at a staggering 67,000. About 37,300 of them are under a contract with the U.S. and receive a stipend of $300 per month.

In theory, the CLCs are a series of neighborhood watch organizations that “augment local force protection, law enforcement and/or infrastructure security,” says Col. Steve Boylan, Petraeus’ spokesman. They help fight AQI and assorted miscreants, supplement U.S. and Iraqi forces, and are meant to be incorporated (eventually) into the regular Iraqi security apparatus. Their creation follows counterinsurgency best-practices, as Kilcullen wrote: “Provided they are under Iraqi government control (a non-trivial proviso), ‘neighborhood watch’ groups motivated by community loyalty and enlightened self-interest are not necessarily a bad thing.”

The trouble is that Kilcullen’s proviso is kicking in with a vengeance. U.S. commanders I’ve interviewed in the past few weeks suggest they have little actual oversight over what the CLCs in their areas of operations do. Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner, a spokesman in Baghdad, says commanders “believe there is good accountability.” But Col. David Sutherland, a brigade commander in Baquba, says he recently detained a CLC leader for using his organization as a gang: They stockpiled illegal weapons, charged extortion money, and “raped a young girl.” Typically, commanders must take on faith that those the CLCs harass are truly AQI. Very often what the CLCs are interested in is consolidating control over a particular area in a warlord-like way. The recently-assassinated Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, a key figure in the establishment of what would become the CLCs , was something of a highway bandit, known for telling the U.S. that rival tribes were AQI sympathizers.

Nor are the CLCs getting absorbed within a distrustful, Shiite-run Iraqi security infrastructure. Col. Martin Stanton, who holds the reconciliation portfolio for Multinational Force-Iraq, warned recently that the CLCs are growing so frustrated with the lack of support from Baghdad that they might easily turn their guns on the government. Anbar province officials visiting Washington earlier this month sounded the same alarm, complaining of a sectarian double standard in police recruitment.

John Bazemore, AP

Georgia Gov. Sonny Perdue and his wife, Mary, pray for rain for their drought-stricken state during a vigil in Atlanta Tuesday. “It’s time to appeal to Him who can and will make a difference,” Perdue said.

Georgia Governor Prays for Rain By GREG BLUESTEIN,
AP, November 13, 2007

ATLANTA (Nov. 13) — Georgia Gov. Sonny Perdue stepped up to a podium outside the state Capitol on Tuesday and led a solemn crowd of several hundred people in a prayer for rain on his drought-stricken state.

“We’ve come together here simply for one reason and one reason only: To very reverently and respectfully pray up a storm,” Perdue said after a choir provided a hymn.Georgia and its neighboring states are caught in an epic drought that threatens public water supplies. Perdue has ordered water restrictions, launched a legal battle against the release of water from federal reservoirs and appealed to President Bush.

“It’s time to appeal to Him who can and will make a difference,” Perdue told the crowd.

The hourlong event was billed as an interfaith ceremony but only three Protestant ministers joined Perdue, who is a Baptist, and Lt. Gov. Casey Cagle.

Nearby, some 20 demonstrators from the Atlanta Freethought Society staged a protest against the holding of a religious observance at the seat of state government.

Meteorologists said earlier this week there was a slight possibility of rain Tuesday, but less of a chance of precipitation was predicted for the rest of the week.

“I believe in miracles,” declared Pastor Maurice Watson of Beulahland Bible Church. “How about you?”

International Crisis Group on Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, November 15, 2007

If SCIRI/ISCI has so far failed in achieving respectability, it is because it has never quite managed to shake off its past as an Iran-bred group of exiles with a narrow sectarian agenda enforced by a potent militia. SCIRI claims with justification that it was established and inspired in response to the Iraqi regime’s tyranny and crimes but perceptions forged during the hard years of the Iran-Iraq war, in which the party and its Badr militia fought alongside Iranian forces, have been slow to change; suspicion that SCIRI remains guided by a foreign hand even as it plants its roots in Iraqi soil has hobbled its ambition….Still, the party is a formidable force. As a result of the U.S. surge, it is benefiting from coalition efforts to suppress not only al-Qaeda in Iraq but also ISCI’s principal rival, the Sadrists’ Mahdi army (Jaysh al-Mahdi). As long as the U.S. remains in Iraq, its alliance with ISCI will help entrench the party in the country’s governing, security and intelligence institutions, in Baghdad as well as most southern governorates. Its only true challenger remains the Mahdi army, which despite its ruffian credentials and bloody role in sectarian reprisals enjoys broad support among Shiite masses. Their rivalry now takes the form of a class struggle between the Shiite merchant elite of Baghdad and the holy cities, represented by ISCI (as well, religiously, by Sistani), and the Shiite urban underclass.

Ricks, Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say - washingtonpost.com, November 15, 2007

CAMP LIBERTY, Iraq — Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.

In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government’s failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but “it’s unclear how long that window is going to be open.”
The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? “If that doesn’t happen,” Odierno said, “we’re going to have to review our strategy.”

Brig. Gen. John F. Campbell, deputy commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, complained last week that Iraqi politicians appear out of touch with everyday citizens. “The ministers, they don’t get out,” he said. “They don’t know what the hell is going on on the ground.” Campbell noted approvingly that Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, the top Iraqi commander in the Baghdad security offensive, lately has begun escorting cabinet officials involved in health, housing, oil and other issues out of the Green Zone to show them, as Campbell put it, “Hey, I got the security, bring in the [expletive] essential services.”

Indeed, some U.S. Army officers now talk more sympathetically about former insurgents than they do about their ostensible allies in the Shiite-led central government.

‘And then what?’, FT, November 12, 2007

“There is no doubt that an element in the government wants to strike Iran,” says retired General Joseph Hoar, a former head of Centcom, making an apparent allusion to Mr Cheney. “But the good news is that the secretary of defence and senior military are against it.”

Anthony Zinni, another former Centcom chief, says even a limited American attack could push Tehran to retaliate in a number of ways, such as firing missiles at Israel, Saudi oilfields and US bases in Iraq, mining the Straits of Hormuz and activating sleeper terrorist cells around the world. “It is not a matter of a one-strike option,” he says, voicing his worries that Iranian retaliation could pull America into a protracted conflict on the ground. “It is the classic question of ‘And then what?’”

Gen Zinni issued similar warnings before the war in Iraq and was paid little heed. But this time things are different. In particular, a number of the military’s most experienced officers echo his misgivings.

“We’re in a conflict in two countries out there right now,” Admiral Mike Mullen, the new chairman of the joint chiefs, told the New York Times last month. “We have to be incredibly thoughtful about the potential of in fact getting into a conflict with a third country in that part of the world.”

Gen Hoar casts doubt on the effectiveness of any attack, arguing that the US military may not have the “proper” weapons to destroy deeply buried sites and that Washington lacks good intelligence on Iran’s nuclear sites, including the existence of any clandestine facilities.