Religion, Nationalism, and Terror

الحياة - اشتباكات متقطعة في البصر April 4, 2008

اشتباكات متقطعة في البصرة والجيش الأميركي يقصف مواقع بالطيران … المالكي يهدد الخارجين عن القانون بـ«صولات فرسان» والصدر يدعو الى تظاهرة مليونية في ذكرى سقوط بغداد

اعتبر رئيس الوزراء العراقي نوري المالكي مواجهات البصرة مع «جيش المهدي» التابع لرجل الدين الشيعي مقتدى الصدر «بداية المنازلة ضد الخارجين عن القانون»،

الى ذلك، جدد قياديون في تيار الصدر رفضهم تسليم سلاح «جيش المهدي»، فيما دعا الصدر أنصاره الى الاعتصام اليوم بعد صلاة الجمعة للمطالبة بـ «فك الحصار عن مدن شيعية»، وتنظيم تظاهرة «مليونية» في النجف لمناسبة الذكرى الخامسة لسقوط بغداد في قبضة الاحتلال الأميركي، في 9 نيسان ابريل عام 2003.

في غضون ذلك، استمرت الاشتباكات متقطعة بين القوات الحكومية والميليشيا الشيعية في البصرة، وشن الجيش الأميركي غارات جوية على مواقع في المدينة وفي الحلة قُتل خلالها مسلحون وعدد من المدنيين. وأكدت مصادر الشرطة ان قتالاً نشب خلال دخول جنود اميركيين يرتدون ملابس مدنية منطقة الجمعية وسط الحلة، حيث خاضوا اشتباكات مع مجهولين واستدعوا طائرة هيليكوبتر لمساندتهم.

More Than 1,000 in Iraq’s Forces Quit Basra Fight - New York Times, April 4, 2008

BAGHDAD — More than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen either refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts during the inconclusive assault against Shiite militias in Basra last week, a senior Iraqi government official said Thursday. Iraqi military officials said the group included dozens of officers, including at least two senior field commanders in the battle.

The desertions in the heat of a major battle cast fresh doubt on the effectiveness of the American-trained Iraqi security forces. The White House has conditioned further withdrawals of American troops on the readiness of the Iraqi military and police.The crisis created by the desertions and other problems with the Basra operation was serious enough that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki hastily began funneling some 10,000 recruits from local Shiite tribes into his armed forces. That move has already generated anger among Sunni tribesmen whom Mr. Maliki has been much less eager to recruit despite their cooperation with the government in its fight against Sunni insurgents and criminal gangs.

A British military official said that Mr. Maliki had brought 6,600 reinforcements to Basra to join the 30,000 security personnel already stationed there, and a senior American military official said that he understood that 1,000 to 1,500 Iraqi forces had deserted or underperformed.

الحياة - المالكي يعتبر أن «من يقاتل الحكومة أسوأ من القاعدة» … الصدر يأمر أتباعه بعدم تسليم السلاح ووحدات عسكرية عراقية لا تريد القتال
مع تواصل المواجهات بين القوات العراقية و»جيش المهدي»، امس، لليوم الخامس في أنحاء مختلفة في العراق، جدد رئيس الوزراء العراقي نوري المالكي اصرار حكومته على المضي في معركة البصرة ضد المسلحين الى النهاية، معتبراً ان «من يقاتل الحكومة اسوأ من القاعدة». ونقل عن الزعيم الشيعي الشاب مقتدى الصدر انه طلب من اتباعه عدم القاء سلاحهم، فيما رفضت وحدات في الجيش العراقي في مدينة الصدر مقاتلة «جيش المهدي» في سابقة لا يعرف بعد مدى تأثيرها وامتدادها على المواجهات بين الطرفين.

رجال شرطة يسلمون أمس أسلحتهم إلى رجل دين من أنصار الصدر في مدينة الصدر. ا ف ب

وبعد الغارات الجوية الأميركية لمواقع المسلحين في مدينة الصدر والبصرة تدخلت القوات البريطانية في المدينة الجنوبية، فقصفت بالمدافع مواقع للمسلحين في شمالها دعماً للقوات العراقية، فيما ارتفعت حصيلة المواجهات الى اكثر من 275 قتيلاً و500 جريح، بحسب مصادر رسمية.

Heavy fighting in southern Iraqi oil hub | World | Reuters, March 25, 2008

BASRA, Iraq Reuters - Heavy fighting erupted on Tuesday in the southern oil city of Basra where Iraqi security forces launched a major operation at dawn against powerful militias, military officials and witnesses said.

A Reuters witness in the city reported seeing black smoke over northern districts and hearing explosions and machinegun fire. A hospital source said “tens of wounded” were arriving at hospitals with some too busy to accept more casualties.

Television pictures showed Iraqi troops running through empty streets and helicopters flying overhead.

“There are clashes in the streets. Bullets are coming from everywhere and we can hear the sound of rocket explosions. This has been going on since dawn,” resident Jamil told Reuters by telephone as he cowered in his home.

Military officials said “many outlaws” had been killed.

Two powerful factions of Iraqs Shiite majority, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Mehdi Army militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, are fighting for power in Basra along with a smaller Shiite party, Fadhila.

Basra is Iraq’s second city and gateway to the Gulf. Its oil fields are the source of most government revenues.

Radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is battling his Shiite rival along lines of personality, class and ideology. (By Alaa Al-marjani — Associated Press)

Sudarsan Raghavan, Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq - washingtonpost.com, December 26, 2007

KARBALA, Iraq — Posted at the door of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s office recently, a flier denounced the arrests of his followers. Up and down the barricaded street, soldiers and policemen loyal to his Shiite rivals stood sentry, some in tan armored personnel carriers, questioning anyone they suspected of links to the populist cleric.

Inside the shuttered office, five guards spoke frankly of their sense of vulnerability and weakness. Once in control of the streets of this southern city of holy sites, the Sadrists said they have been chased underground, their rivals at their heels.

The arrests of Sadr’s loyalists are part of a broader power struggle between the two most powerful Shiite factions seeking to lead Iraq: the Sadrists, who are pushing for U.S. troops to withdraw, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Bush administration’s main Shiite ally. Given the nation’s majority-Shiite population, this intensifying confrontation could play a major role in deciding Iraq’s future.

(Warning: The film accessible by clicking on this article’s title contains graphic images.)

Mona Mahmoud, Maggie O’Kane and Ian Black, UK has left behind murder and chaos, says Basra police chief, Guardian, December 17, 2007

In an ITV film on the Guardian Unlimited website , Basra’s police chief lists a catalogue of failings, saying:

· Basra has become so lawless that in the last three months 45 women have been killed for being “immoral” because they were not fully covered or because they may have given birth outside wedlock;

· The British unintentionally rearmed Shia militias by failing to recognise that Iraqi troops were loyal to more than one authority;

· Shia militia are better armed than his men and control Iraq’s main port.

Patrick Cockburn, Britain bows out of a five-year war it could never have won - Independent, December 17, 2007

The British Army some time ago concluded that its patrols simply provided targets for militiamen without doing any good.

The steady retreat of the British has not so far been followed by a battle for Basra between the three main contenders for power. These are the Fadhila movement, which controls much of the government, the Mehdi Army militia, loyal to the nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Organisation of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

All these groups control in part or in full different units of the security forces, as well as valuable economic concessions, such as Basra port, through which flows much of Iraq’s imports. Iran also retains a pervasive though often invisible influence over the militias.

Britain is officially handing over control, nominal though it may have been, of Basra to government security forces. This has supposedly long been the aim of the US and Britain in southern Iraq, but in practice both countries have increasingly favoured one only of the Shia parties, ISCI, as its favoured ally. This may eventually lead to a backlash by the Mehdi Army and Fadhila.

Amit R. Paley, On the Sidelines in Basra: British Tackle a New Role, WP, December 17, 2007

…interviews with three senior Iraqi security officials in Basra yielded three different sets of data on violence in the province. The provincial police chief said the number of killings, which occurred mainly in Basra city, had decreased from 142 in June to 75 last month, while the military commander in the province said the drop over that time period went from 154 to fewer than 70. Another senior military official said the decline had been less steep, going from 83 in June to 74 in November.

“If you want to know about the security situation, you can’t rely on the figures from officials,” Brig. Gen. Jalil Khalaf, the provincial police chief, said with a laugh. “All the officials have their own interests.”

Khalaf confirmed anecdotal reports from Basra residents that Shiite militias had perpetrated horrendous violence against women, killing dozens of them for wearing pants or not covering their heads in traditional Muslim fashion….

Because of a dispute between parties, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki does not recognize the current provincial governor, Mohammed Mossibh Mohammed Waili, and has appointed the current police and military chiefs as his main representatives here.

The two chiefs said they had been ordered by Maliki not to communicate with Waili, and the British forces planned to formally hand over security to the military commander, Gen. Mohan H. Fahad, instead of the governor

Lori Hinnant, British Hand Over Basra to Iraqi Control, AP, washingtonpost.com, December 16, 2007

Britain’s Saturday, Dec. 15, 2007, handover of Basra province will have a limited effect on security in Iraq’s biggest oil region because rival Shiite warlords and local officials have been wielding the real power in the area. The main players in Basra and southern Iraq are the powerful Shiite entities, al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia; Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the largest Shiite political party and the Badr Brigade militia, which has largely been absorbed into the Iraqi security forces; and the Fadhila party, which also has its own fighters and a member as Basra’s governor.

Aref Mohammed, Shi’ite factions proclaim truce in Iraq’s Basra, Reuters, December 11, 2007

Rival Shi’ite factions, each with their own militia and political agendas, have vied for control in Basra since 2003.

Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers are thought to have the most clout on the streets, while the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has influence in the security forces and the smaller Fadhila party controls the governorate.

Each has a different view on regional autonomy: Sadr opposes it, the Supreme Council wants Basra as part of a Shi’ite region across the south and Fadhila wants autonomy for Basra itself.

Some of the militia have imposed strict Islamic codes. Women have been killed for so-called “honour crimes” and walls have been painted with threats against those who go out unveiled.

For much of the year, the situation deteriorated. British troops who patrolled Basra came under escalating bombing and mortar attacks until September, when they quit their base in the city centre for the airbase on its outskirts.

Since then, with no more British troops in the city to attack, violence has abated. Many ordinary Basrawis say the city feels safer and government troops appear to be in charge.

“I don’t think there’s any truth to talk of militias ruling Basra. It’s true that sometimes they carry weapons and sometimes spark clashes but the government and its forces are the ones who almost always win,” said university lecturer Wisam Hamid.

Commander Firaiji said most violence was not political.

“We have no militants in the streets, no terrorism in Basra, no crime-infested areas. We still have some organised crime, honour crimes and personal acts of revenge. But politically motivated crimes do not exceed four percent,” he said.

Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Commanders Say Iraqi Police Can Be Reformed - washingtonpost.com, December 11, 2007

U.S. military commanders in Baghdad have concluded that Iraq’s 27,000-member national police force has made progress in weeding out officers involved in sectarian violence and should not be disbanded, countering the judgment of an independent commission that last fall deemed the police corrupt beyond repair and recommended that the force be eliminated.

The Iraqi efforts are “bearing fruit,” said Army Maj. Gen. Michael Jones, commander of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, which advises the Iraqi Interior Ministry. “We have seen a significant change in their performance and behavior. For the most part, they are doing a good job.”

The new assessment follows a classified U.S. military review of Iraq’s Interior Ministry and its security forces completed in late October. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, ordered the review after the commission, led by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, issued a report on Sept. 6 that described the Interior Ministry as dysfunctional and said the police force was “not viable in its current form.”Although U.S. commanders in Iraq acknowledge serious problems within the national police, they said such issues in part reflect larger struggles in Iraqi society and are unlikely to be eliminated by scrapping the police force and starting over. Instead, the Interior Ministry intends to adjust the mission of the national police, gradually withdrawing its forces from neighborhoods and moving them to regional garrisons across the country, where they will serve as an emergency response force, according to Maj. Gen. Michael Jones, who advises Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani. As part of the shift, the force may be consolidated, he said.

AFP / Getty
Newly graduated Iraqi soldiers parade at Bismaya military camp in the southeastern outskirts of Baghdad.

Charles Crain, The Mahdi Militia: Quiet But Not Gone, TIME, Nov. 27, 2007

In the east Baghdad neighborhood patrolled by Capt. Mike Juarez and the men of Charlie Company, 1-8 Cavalry, Iraq’s most feared militia is keeping its head down. Since Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army declared a unilateral cease-fire at the end of August, the Americans have been able operate freely in some of Baghdad’s worst areas, and have faced very few serious attacks. But in Juarez’s neighborhood, as elsewhere, the militia retains an insidious weapon: a presence within the Iraqi government’s security forces.

On a recent night patrol Juarez and his men went door to door, discussing everything from electricity to security with residents. One home had a picture of Sadr, the militia chieftain, on display in the living room. It turned out that the man of the house was a member of the Iraqi security forces.

In the back-and-forth that followed, the man told the Americans that he did not work with the militia, and did not have any colleagues who did either. Eventually, though, he said he might know a few cops or soldiers whose loyalties lie with the Mahdi Army (”Jaish al-Mahdi” in Arabic, “JAM” in the parlance of U.S. soldiers). The Americans left the man with a phone number to call so he could leave anonymous tips.

Talking about the exchange outside the man’s house, the Americans were skeptical. “He’s probably in the JAM,” said Lt. Michael Shevcik. The next day Juarez concurred. “Yes, one hundred percent. He’ll never call.”

With the Mahdi Army’s cease-fire mostly holding up, it’s hard to say exactly how much influence the militia still retains within Iraqi police and army units. Officers in 1-8 say the problem has declined over the course of the year. But on the streets of east Baghdad the signs are less reassuring. Juarez and his men noted that the perpetrators of a recent rocket attack on their base had to pass through an Iraqi Army checkpoint, raising the possibility that Iraqi soldiers turned a blind eye.

American commanders acknowledge that men affiliated with the militia are still working within Iraqi police and army units. But in areas like the one patrolled by 1-8 Cavalry — which borders the militia stronghold of Sadr City — anyone of any consequence is affiliated, at least to some extent, with the militia or Sadr’s political organization.

When night falls, the assassins gather in Hayaniya Square, Guardian, November 17, 2007

Hayaniya Square in Basra is a busy intersection leading to a poor and run-down neighbourhood. On one side of the piazza, sewage water flows through what was once a dried-up river bed, filling the air with an oppressive smell. On the other side, a pair of kebab stalls send columns of smoke from skewers of burning meat into the warm air. Two sheep, whose fate lies on those skewers, stand tethered to a nearby telegraph pole.

The square is dominated by a painting of six men dressed in casual trousers and jackets, behind whom loom the faces of Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi army, and his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. The six men, described on the mural as martyrs, are Mahdi army commanders who were killed by the British.

At night, when traffic in the square slows, a group of men gather. These are the sakkaka, or assassins. Their Toyota saloons, chosen for the voluminous boots that can accommodate two bodies with room to spare, stand parked nearby.

The assassins chat, eat kebabs and stroll around in small groups, discussing their sinister trade. They buy and sell names of collaborators, Iraqis who worked for the British, as well as journalists and uncooperative police officers, businessmen and the footsoldiers of other militias.

Depending on the nature of their perceived crime, the price on a collaborator’s head can vary from couple of hundred dollars to a few thousand. The most valuable lives these days in Basra are those of the interpreters and contractors who were employed by the British before they withdrew from the city.

Britain’s failure in Iraq, by David Wearing, Le Monde diplomatique, November, 2007

Last month’s announcement of substantial withdrawals of British troops from southern Iraq is a useful vantage point from which to review Britain’s part in the occupation. The role of the United States has been the more important, and is far better documented and understood. But Britain’s role has not been insignificant, especially for the people of southern Iraq.

In 2003, Britain promised a post-Saddam Iraq that would be “a stable, united and law-abiding state providing effective representative government to its own people.” That those ambitions have not been realised is now widely acknowledged even within the political establishment. A recent report by Michael Knights and Ed Williams described Iraq’s deep south, the area for which Britain is responsible, as “a kleptocracy” where “well armed political-criminal mafiosi have locked both the central government and the people out of power” (1).

Britain’s official goals have now been significantly downgraded to keeping violence at a manageable level, and leaving local administrators and security services to deal with the situation. Even this is far from being achieved, and Britain faces these problems in near isolation from the international community. British policymakers and analysts will be asking themselves what went wrong for many years to come.

Iraqi City In The Grip Of Militias, Al Jazeera English, October 31, 2007

Amid warnings that southern Iraq could erupt into civil war when British troops withdraw, Basra’s chief of police has publicly admitted that his forces have been unable to clamp down on growing militia warfare in the city.

In recent months, rival Shia factions have been battling for control of the city which is considered the second largest in the country and home to Iraq’s only port.

This makes the Basra a vital outlet to the Gulf for marine transportation of oil and fuel products – a lucrative prize for any political faction looking to consolidate its power in Baghdad.

The ensuing power struggle has led to an exodus of Sunni, Shia and Christian families northwards and often out of the country.

Earlier this week, Major-General Jalil Khalaf, commander of the Basra police department, admitted for the first time that the militias have proven too strong for – and often infiltrated - his forces.

Speaking to As-Sabah, the official Iraqi daily, he said: “Most of Basra’s ports, especially Um Qasr, are under the control of militia gangs.

“The police force is incapable of executing its duties because its members report to Basra’s militias and (political) parties which own those militias.