Religion, Nationalism, and Terror

Pew Global Attitudes Project: III. Islam, Modernity and Terrorism: The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, June 13, 2007

In Jordan, confidence in bin Laden has plummeted since May 2005. A year ago, 25% of Jordanians said they had a lot of confidence in bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs,” while another 35% said they had some confidence. Today, almost no Jordanians (fewer than 1%) express a lot of confidence in bin Laden, and 24% say they have some confidence in him.

In Pakistan, confidence in bin Laden also has fallen, though not quite as dramatically. In May 2005, a majority of Pakistanis (51%) expressed at least some confidence in bin Laden; that number has declined to 38% in the current survey.

To be sure, bin Laden still has followers in the Muslim world. Fully 61% of Muslims in Nigeria express a lot of confidence (33%) or some confidence (28%) in bin Laden; that represents a significant increase from May 2003 (44%). Bin Laden’s standing in Pakistan has eroded, but more Pakistanis still express at least some confidence in bin Laden than say they have little or no confidence in him (by 38% to 30%). And a third of Indonesians continue to express at least some confidence in the al Qaeda leader.

Among European Muslims, only about one-in-twenty Muslims in Germany and France express even some confidence in bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs. But that figure rises to 14% among Muslims in Great Britain, and 16% of Spanish Muslims.

aljazeera.net, December 29, 2007, بن لادن يدعو “لرفض خطة أميركية للسيطرة على نفط العراق”

دعا زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أسامة بن لادن العراقيين لرفض “خطة أميركية بتشكيل حكومة جديدة من أجل السيطرة على إمدادات النفط وبناء قواعد عسكرية والهيمنة على المنطقة”

وقال بن لادن في تسجيل صوتي على شبكة الإنترنت إن من يشاركون في الخطة “يخرجون من ملة الإسلام”, مشيرا إلى أن الهدف من الخطة هو إعطاء الأميركيين كل ما يريدونه من نفط العراق

وكانت الجزيرة بثت في أكتوبر/تشرين الماضي تسجيلا صوتيا منسوبا لزعيم تنظيم القاعدة حمل عنوان “رسالة لأهل العراق”, دعا فيها تنظيمه والجماعات المسلحة إلى نبذ التعصب وتوحيد صفوفها وتغليب مصلحة الأمة الإسلامية على ما عداها وتحكيم شرع الله في كل أمر.

Bin Laden Discusses Iraq and Israel, AP, New York Times, December 29, 2007

CAIRO, Egypt (AP) — Osama bin Laden warned Iraq’s Sunni Arabs against fighting al-Qaida and vowed to expand the terror group’s holy war to Israel in a new audiotape Saturday, threatening ”blood for blood, destruction for destruction.”

Most of the 56-minute tape dealt with Iraq, apparently al-Qaida’s latest attempt to keep supporters in Iraq unified at a time when the U.S. military claims to have al-Qaida’s Iraq branch on the run.

The tape did not mention Pakistan or the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, though Pakistan’s government has blamed al-Qaida and the Taliban for her death on Thursday.

But bin Laden’s comments offered an unusually direct attack on Israel, which has warned of growing al-Qaida activity in Palestinian territory. The terror network is not believed to have taken a strong role there so far.

”We intend to liberate Palestine, the whole of Palestine from the (Jordan) river to the sea,” he said, threatening ”blood for blood, destruction for destruction.”

”We will not recognize even one inch for Jews in the land of Palestine as other Muslim leaders have,” bin Laden said.

In Iraq, a number of Sunni Arab tribes in western Anbar province have formed a coalition fighting al-Qaida-linked insurgents that U.S. officials credit for deeply reducing violence in the province. The U.S. military has been working to form similar ”Awakening Councils” in other areas of Iraq.

Pakistani former premier Benazir Bhutto (L) and party vice president Makhdoom Amin Faheem (R) look on during her last election campaign rally in Rawalpindi 27 December 2007.

Photo from Getty Images by AFP/Getty Images - Daylife, December 27, 2007

Summary in English by Juan Cole, December 27, 2007

Sawt al-Iraq reports in Arabic that Abd al-Jalil Khalaf, the police chief of Basra, told the al-Arabiya satellite news channel on Wednesday that a shadowy group calling itself “Commanding the Good and Forbidding what is Prohibited” has recently killed 50 women in the southern port. It is probably a puritanical Shiite group, and it says it objects to make-up (tabarruj or the wanton display of oneself in public). The women killed have been for the most part Muslims (both Sunni and Shiite), though two were Christians.

Trudy Rubin, Now Iraq needs a surge of political will for reconciliation — baltimoresun.com, December 25, 2007

Now people have the breathing room to assess their sectarian parties that have failed to deliver services or safety while indulging in astounding levels of corruption. The judgments I heard from every Iraqi I spoke with were unremittingly harsh.

Even the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has had to pay attention to popular dissatisfaction with the shakedowns and murders carried out by thugs in his Mahdi Army militia. He has dispersed hit men to try to eliminate some of the more egregious violators in Baghdad neighborhoods. I spoke to one, a hard-faced, middle-aged tough named Abu Ali, who was limping from a gunshot wound to the leg; he told me his men had killed 17 “criminals” in Baghdad’s Hurriyah district on Mr. al-Sadr’s orders. The Shiite mafiosi are cleaning house.

Iraq’s Shiite religious leaders, too, are weighing in on the government’s failures. The leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, sent word through his spokesmen of his dissatisfaction with the fact that much of the parliament had decamped to Saudi Arabia for the Muslim pilgrimage at government expense. This at a time when crucial laws on oil and provincial elections are languishing in committees. Ayatollah al-Sistani said that parliamentarians would get no religious credit for the hajj because they had abandoned their duty.

Radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is battling his Shiite rival along lines of personality, class and ideology. (By Alaa Al-marjani — Associated Press)

Sudarsan Raghavan, Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq - washingtonpost.com, December 26, 2007

KARBALA, Iraq — Posted at the door of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s office recently, a flier denounced the arrests of his followers. Up and down the barricaded street, soldiers and policemen loyal to his Shiite rivals stood sentry, some in tan armored personnel carriers, questioning anyone they suspected of links to the populist cleric.

Inside the shuttered office, five guards spoke frankly of their sense of vulnerability and weakness. Once in control of the streets of this southern city of holy sites, the Sadrists said they have been chased underground, their rivals at their heels.

The arrests of Sadr’s loyalists are part of a broader power struggle between the two most powerful Shiite factions seeking to lead Iraq: the Sadrists, who are pushing for U.S. troops to withdraw, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Bush administration’s main Shiite ally. Given the nation’s majority-Shiite population, this intensifying confrontation could play a major role in deciding Iraq’s future.

Hala Jaber, American-backed killer militias strut across Iraq - Times Online, November 25, 2007

Even the militia commanders confirm that they have the Shi’ites in their long-range sights after a turbulent few months.

First they tired of Al-Qaeda’s beheadings, bombings and strange demands, such as a ban on salads containing (male) cucumbers and (female) tomatoes, and on ice cubes because the Prophet Muhammad never had them.

Then the militias threw in their lot with the Americans to get rid of Al-Qaeda, but without losing their animosity for the occupying forces that many of them had been fighting.

Now they are starting to think about what happens when the Americans leave and how they can counter Iranian-backed Shi’ite forces. Abu Omar, an intelligence officer with the Baghdad Brigade in Abu Ghraib, was candid.

“Of course the coming war is with the [Shi’ite] militias,” he said. “God willing, we will defeat them and get rid of them just as we did Al-Qaeda.”

Abu Maroof, one of the brigade’s commanders, said that he regarded the Shi’ite militias, which include the Mahdi Army of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, as more dangerous than the United States. But he is also increasingly hostile to the government of Nouri al-Maliki, which is reluctant to absorb militia members into the official Iraqi security forces.

The Surge: Illusion and Reality - by Conn Hallinan, AW, December 25, 2007

The narrative in the media these days is the success of the U.S. “surge,” which has poured an additional 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq since early January 2007. In early December, war critic and close ally of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi U.S. Rep. John Murtha (D-Penn.) said, “I think the surge is working.”

Polls indicate that concern over the economy has replaced the war as the major issue for voters and that, while a majority of Americans want the troops out, those saying that things are going better jumped from 33 percent to just under 50 percent.

Are they going better? Car bombings, sectarian violence, and attacks on U.S. troops are down, although 2007 has been the deadliest year of the war for the Americans. But does the reduced violence have anything to do with the “surge”?

As Patrick Cockburn of The Independent points out, Americans and the U.S. media tend to “exaggerate the extent to which the U.S. is making the political weather and is in control of events there.”

Take the attacks on Americans, which are down. The Sunni-based resistance carried out the majority of those. Sunnis, who constitute 5 million of Iraq’s 27 million people (there are 16 million Shi’ites and five million Kurds), dominated the country under Saddam Hussein.

Initially the Sunnis formed an alliance with al-Qaeda that turned out to be a disaster. Al-Qaeda, an extremist Sunni organization, targeted Shi’ites, whom it considers heretics. The relentless bombings and shootings culminating in the 2006 bombing of the Golden mosque in Samarra, spurred Shi’ite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, to counterattack.

The Sunnis suddenly found themselves fighting a two-front war against the Americans and the Shi’ites, a war they cannot win. They soon were driven out of large sections of Baghdad by the Shi’ites while absorbing massive casualties from the U.S. military campaign.

These defeats forced the Sunnis to turn on al-Qaeda and to reach a détente with the U.S. In return, the new Sunni militias – like the Baghdad Brigade, the Knights of Ameriya, and the Guardians of Ghazaliya – were given vehicles, uniforms, flak jackets and $300 a month for each member by the Americans. Starting months before the “surge,” the so-called “Sunni awakening” soon fielded 77,000 militia members, larger than the 60,000-member Mahdi Army and half the size of the Iraqi army.

But according to the Sunday Times, many of these Sunnis were formerly al-Qaeda members, and the current “truce” with the Americans is little more than a tactical maneuver to buy time. “Of course the coming war is with the [Shi’ite] militias,” Baghdad Brigade intelligence officer Abu Omar told the Times. “God willing, we will defeat them and get rid of them just as we did with al-Qaeda.”

Jehad Nga for The New York Times

On Christmas Eve, the Rev. Thaer al-Sheik offered communion to a dwindling congregation at Sacred Heart Church in Baghdad.

Damien Cave, At Christmas, Iraqi Christians Ask for Forgiveness, and for Peace - New York Times, December 25, 2007

Sacred Heart Church is not Iraq’s largest or most beleaguered Christian congregation. It is as ordinary as its steeple is squat, in one of Baghdad’s safest neighborhoods, with a small school next door.

But for those who came to Sacred Heart for Mass on Christmas Eve, there seemed to be as much sadness as joy. Despite the improved security across Iraq, which some parishioners cited as cause for hope, the day’s sermon focused on continuing struggles.

Iraq’s Christians have fared poorly since the fall of Saddam Hussein, with their houses or businesses frequently attacked. Some priests estimate that as much as two-thirds of the community, or about one million people, have fled, making Sacred Heart typical. Though a handful have recently returned from abroad, only 120 people attended Mass on Monday night, down from 400 two years ago.

Aftermath
The fighting in Lebanon spread to the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, where the dust settles after several days of fighting. Ben Curtis / AP

The Year in Images - Photo Essays - TIME

Gordon Lubold, Do U.S. prisons in Iraq breed insurgents? | csmonitor.com, December 20, 2007

Washington - American officials have detained thousands of insurgents in the months since the surge of forces began this spring, in an effort that most agree has improved security in Iraq. But now the commander of the American detention facilities in Iraq is wondering aloud if holding all those detainees is breeding a “micro-insurgency” and asking whether it’s time to begin releasing thousands of people.

The two main detention facilities operated by the US military in Iraq, at Camp Bucca near Basra and Camp Cropper in Baghdad, have swollen to hold nearly 30,000 detainees. That’s not the 40,000 individuals Army Gen. David Petraeus allotted for when American forces began to implement the Baghdad security plan this spring. But it may be too many, says Marine Maj. Gen. Doug Stone, who oversees detainees for the US-led force.

Holding thousands of “moderate” detainees runs counter to the notion of winning over a population in a classic counterinsurgency, he says….

He made an impassioned plea recently when Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway paid a visit to Bucca in November. General Conway came away impressed with the programs Stone has implemented there and is concerned that the growing number of detainees doesn’t make sense anymore.”If you roll up 150 guys in a village and you don’t have probable cause, you’ve just created 150 little terrorists,” says Conway, who says the US must review the process.

World Press Photo of the Year 2006
Spencer Platt, USA, Getty Images. Young Lebanese drive through devastated neighborhood of South Beirut, 15 August, 2006

Munson: The main reason for recording human brutality, in pictures or in words,  should be to induce humans to become more humane. It should obviously never be a form of “voyeurism.” Those who record the agony of others violate their privacy in a way that can only be justified if it induces others to recognize the need to eliminate or at least curb unnecessary violence. Violating people’s privacy simply to take a prize-winning photograph is wrong.  But if a picture portraying human brutality can both induce humans to become more humane and win prizes, that is fine. Indeed, the prize may well increase exposure to the picture and the basic message it is intended to convey.

Mai Ghoussoub, Beirut and contradiction: reading the World Press Photo award, openDemocracy

Four stylish young women, an open-topped car, the rubble of war-torn Beirut … but where is the real power of Spencer Platt’s prize-winning image, asks Mai Ghoussoub.

(This article was first published on 13 February 2007)

I am certain that Spencer Platt’s picture which won the World Press Photo prize for 2006 looked disturbing and even repellent to most viewers at first glance. I admit that it bothered me when I first saw it on my screen. But I also admit that I kept on looking at it. What was it that intrigued me in this picture despite my unexplained revulsion? Why did I feel that I had to write about what I saw in the picture?

…I went to a housewarming party and I overheard two young Lebanese arguing about the same photo. Both were in their 20s and very “cosmopolitan”. One said: I think this is a great photograph, it shows us as we are, not people associated only with war and destruction. The second one was appalled and said: this is the “new orientalism” - instead of the women depicted in Delacroix’s classic orientalist paintings, today we have these modern, model-type Lebanese women against a background of war and poverty….I believe that the photo is stunning in the metaphor it creates about war photography. It tells us about the voyeurism of the photographer, of the act of taking photos in tragic situations: if there is a contradiction, it is in the encounter between art, beauty and tragedy. Covering a disaster in order to create a striking image is what Robert Capa did best, he became an icon for it and we, the viewers are becoming addicted to this art form.

Ned Parker / Los Angeles Times
CHANGING ALLEGIANCE: Abu Abed, far right, with members of his paramilitary group. A former insurgent and officer in Hussein’s army, he helped drive Al Qaeda in Iraq out of Amiriya.

Ned Parker, Ruthless, shadowy — and a U.S. ally - Los Angeles Times, December 22, 2007

BAGHDAD — “Abu Abed, you’re a hero,” the retired Shiite teacher shouted from the home she had fled last winter, when the bodies of Shiites were being dumped daily in the streets of her Amiriya neighborhood.

The fighter, wearing green camouflage and dark wraparound sunglasses, kept walking, his hand swinging a black MP-5 submachine gun.

No more than 5 feet 6, with a roll of baby fat, this Sunni Muslim gunman is an unlikely savior of Amiriya: a former intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein’s army, a suspected onetime insurgent, a man who has photos of his brothers’ mutilated corpses loaded in his cellphone.

To many Iraqis, Abu Abed is a Sunni warlord whose followers have spilled the blood of Shiite Muslim civilians and U.S. troops. But to the people in Amiriya, he is the man who has, with ruthless efficiency, restored order to a neighborhood where the insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq held sway.

An Afghan man from the village of Yaka China carrying a child, injured during an Apache helicopter attack, for treatment by American medics. Tim Hetherington

Sebastian Junger, Into the Valley of Death, Vanity Fair, January 2008

By many measures, Afghanistan is falling apart. The Afghan opium crop has flourished in the past two years and now represents 93 percent of the world’s supply, with an estimated street value of $38 billion in 2006. That money helps bankroll an insurgency that is now operating virtually within sight of the capital, Kabul. Suicide bombings have risen eightfold in the past two years, including several devastating attacks in Kabul, and as of October, coalition casualties had surpassed those of any previous year. The situation has gotten so bad, in fact, that ethnic and political factions in the northern part of the country have started stockpiling arms in preparation for when the international community decides to pull out. Afghans—who have seen two foreign powers on their soil in 20 years—are well aware of the limits of empire. They are well aware that everything has an end point, and that in their country end points are bloodier than most.

The Korengal is widely considered to be the most dangerous valley in northeastern Afghanistan, and Second Platoon is considered the tip of the spear for the American forces there. Nearly one-fifth of all combat in Afghanistan occurs in this valley, and nearly three-quarters of all the bombs dropped by nato forces in Afghanistan are dropped in the surrounding area. The fighting is on foot and it is deadly, and the zone of American control moves hilltop by hilltop, ridge by ridge, a hundred yards at a time. There is literally no safe place in the Korengal Valley. Men have been shot while asleep in their barracks tents.