Religion, Nationalism, and Terror

Bilal Hussein/The Associated Press

This photo of insurgents in Ramadi by Bilal Hussein helped win The Associated Press a Pulitzer Prize in 2005.

Tim Arango, Case Lays Bare the Media’s Reliance on Iraqi Journalists - New York Times, December 17, 2007

Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi photographer who had a hand in The Associated Press’s 2005 Pulitzer Prize for photography before being jailed without charges by the United States military, finally had a day in court last week. But his story, which highlights the unprecedented role that Iraqis are playing in news coverage of the war, is really just beginning.

He was held for around 20 months by the military — in Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere, with no right to contest his detention — before being turned over to an Iraqi magistrate, who will act as a one-man grand jury and decide if there is enough evidence to link him to the insurgency. He has not been formally charged with a crime.The Associated Press has staunchly defended Mr. Hussein, pointing out that his role as a journalist involved getting close to the insurgency. Over the last three years, the American military has held at least eight other Iraqi journalists for periods of weeks or month without charges and released them all, apparently unable to find ties to the insurgency, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, an independent nonprofit organization.

Amit R. Paley, On the Sidelines in Basra: British Tackle a New Role, WP, December 17, 2007

…interviews with three senior Iraqi security officials in Basra yielded three different sets of data on violence in the province. The provincial police chief said the number of killings, which occurred mainly in Basra city, had decreased from 142 in June to 75 last month, while the military commander in the province said the drop over that time period went from 154 to fewer than 70. Another senior military official said the decline had been less steep, going from 83 in June to 74 in November.

“If you want to know about the security situation, you can’t rely on the figures from officials,” Brig. Gen. Jalil Khalaf, the provincial police chief, said with a laugh. “All the officials have their own interests.”

Khalaf confirmed anecdotal reports from Basra residents that Shiite militias had perpetrated horrendous violence against women, killing dozens of them for wearing pants or not covering their heads in traditional Muslim fashion….

Because of a dispute between parties, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki does not recognize the current provincial governor, Mohammed Mossibh Mohammed Waili, and has appointed the current police and military chiefs as his main representatives here.

The two chiefs said they had been ordered by Maliki not to communicate with Waili, and the British forces planned to formally hand over security to the military commander, Gen. Mohan H. Fahad, instead of the governor

Lori Hinnant, British Hand Over Basra to Iraqi Control, AP, washingtonpost.com, December 16, 2007

Britain’s Saturday, Dec. 15, 2007, handover of Basra province will have a limited effect on security in Iraq’s biggest oil region because rival Shiite warlords and local officials have been wielding the real power in the area. The main players in Basra and southern Iraq are the powerful Shiite entities, al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia; Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the largest Shiite political party and the Badr Brigade militia, which has largely been absorbed into the Iraqi security forces; and the Fadhila party, which also has its own fighters and a member as Basra’s governor.

Iraqis carry their luggage through Baghdad after returning from Syria this month. Many refugees come back to find their houses occupied or ransacked, and their neighborhoods transformed into sectarian strongholds. (By Wathiq Khuzaie — Getty Images)

Karen DeYoung, Balkanized Homecoming - washingtonpost.com, December 16, 2007

When the Iraqi government last month invited home the 1.4 million refugees who had fled this war-ravaged country for Syria — and said it would send buses to pick them up — the United Nations and the U.S. military reacted with horror.

Iraqis carry their luggage through Baghdad after returning from Syria this month. Many refugees come back to find their houses occupied or ransacked, and their neighborhoods transformed into sectarian strongholds.

U.N. refugee officials immediately advised against the move, saying any new arrivals risked homelessness, unemployment and deprivation in a place still struggling to take care of the people already here. For the military, the prospect of refugees returning to reclaim houses long since occupied by others, particularly in Baghdad, threatened to destroy fragile security improvements.

“It’s a problem that everybody can grasp,” said a senior U.S. diplomat here. “You move back to the house that you left and find that somebody else has moved into the house, maybe because they’ve been displaced from someplace else. And it’s even more difficult than that, because in many cases the local militias . . . have seized control and threw out anybody in that neighborhood they didn’t like.”…

In most of Baghdad, the population shift has been at the expense of Sunnis, many of whose former neighborhoods are newly populated by poorer Shiite migrants under militia protection and, often, control. Groups such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia “are no longer just thugs who are carrying guns around on the street,” the diplomat said, speaking on the condition of anonymity about the issue. “They’ve kind of supplanted local government, with streams of revenue — rent from housing they’ve taken over, protection money from businesses,” and control of fuel and electricity supplies.

At least 300,000 Gazans rally to mark Hamas’ 20th anniversary - Haaretz, December 16, 2007

Meshal said Abbas, who controls the West Bank, does not have the mandate to negotiate with Israel.

Addressing the rally, senior Hamas official Mushir al-Masri warned Israel to expect many casualties if Israel Defense Forces troops launch a major operation in the coastal territory in an attempt to stop almost daily rocket fire by militants at Israel.

“Jews, go back, because we have already dug graves for you,” Masri said. Israel carries out regular raids on Gaza and has killed dozens of militants in the past month….

Large pictures of Hamas’ leaders, both in Gaza and in exile, were draped across the speakers’ podium. A black banner hanging from a nearby building read, in Arabic, English and French: “We will not recognize Israel.”

“This is the real referendum on the popularity of resistance, the people converging behind Hamas,” said Zayed Herzallah, a 28-year old merchant, who brought a van full of young relatives. “Hamas today, after 20 years and after thousands of martyrs, is graduating the fourth generation (of supporters).”

Emilio Morenatti/Associated Press

About 200,000 Gazans rallied in a show of force from Hamas on the 20th anniversary of its founding.

Steven Erlanger and Taghreed El-Khodary, Gazans Rally on Hamas Anniversary, New York Times, December 15, 2007

GAZA — About 200,000 Gazans rallied in support of Hamas on Saturday, the 20th anniversary of its founding.

It was a significant show of force from Hamas, which took over Gaza six months ago in a rapid rout of Fatah forces. The rally was intended to display popular “samoud,” or steadfastness, in the face of the diplomatic and economic isolation of Gaza, which Israel has declared a “hostile entity.” It was easily as large as one a month ago for its rival, the Fatah faction, on the anniversary of the death of Yasir Arafat, and estimates ranged up to 250,000 people….

The crowd featured many who are poor and devout, with many veiled women and masked men. Layali al-Kher, 27, said that there was little money in her family, because factories and construction has largely stopped due to restrictions on cement and raw materials. “But this siege was not imposed by Hamas but on them, so why should we criticize them?” she asked. “They’ve put Hamas in a bottle and they are trying to suffocate it. But they have achieved a lot: the streets are safe, the traffic is controlled. They have adapted quickly and have a strong will.”

Ms. Kher said that she supported the armed struggle against Israel, as did Myasar Suleiman, 56, whose family of six sons and three daughters is largely supported by her husband, who sells vegetables, and by United Nations aid to refugees. Her son, Saleh, saw his salary cut by Ramallah because of his ties to Hamas, she said.

Giustozzi, The resurgence of the neo-Taliban, openDemocracy December 14, 2007

The neo-Taliban’s achievement in widening its sphere of influence is all the more remarkable given that the movement’s fighters are recklessly brave - a fact remarked on by coalition troops - but tactically often naïve. This explains why they have suffered high casualties and turned to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as “force multipliers”. From 2005, the movement also resorted to suicide-bombings, although these have more of a psychological than a strategic impact. Contrary to a widespread view among Afghans, therefore, military proficiency is not the key to the neo-Taliban’s success.

The movement is more technologically accomplished than hitherto and its media-savvy propaganda campaigns utilise DVDs and other formerly detested symbols of western influence. And while some field-commanders now rely on laptops to track logistics and casualties and help plan attacks, technical illiteracy among rank-and-file fighters continues to hamper its campaign, ruling out the effective deployment of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.

Mark Lattimer on the brutal treatment of women in Iraq, Guardian, December 13, 2007

Khanim’s organisation sees cases from across Iraq, including from Baghdad and as far away as Basra. She tells me of a man from Kirkuk who accused his sister of adultery. “When we asked him why he wanted to kill his sister, he said, ‘Because it is now a democracy in Iraq’. He thought that democracy meant he could do whatever he wanted.” But the man’s stupidity hid an important point: under the new system of government developing in Iraq, family disputes are increasingly settled not in state courts but by local tribal or religious authorities. “Not that any religion allows such abuse - it is the culture,” says Khanim. “And we see cases from all the communities, including the Christians. It is even worse outside Kurdistan.”

An Iraqi staff member at the UN mission agrees. “As there is no state authority in Iraq, everyone turns to the local sheikh. Every year since 2003 honour killings have increased.” In just one month last year, 130 unclaimed women’s bodies were counted in the Baghdad morgue, a representative from the Organisation of Women’s Freedom in Iraq has told the BBC. Another women’s activist tells me why she refuses all media interviews: “The work has to be secret. In Kurdistan it is possible, but in Baghdad we couldn’t open a shelter for women, we would just be attacked.”

In a nondescript building on a busy road in the north I visit one of the few secret shelters in Iraq for women fleeing violence. A broom-cupboard door is unlocked to reveal a hidden staircase, leading to a two-room apartment where the morning sunshine and the hum of traffic filter through high-set windows. A pile of thin mattresses show that up to 20 women can stay here at any one time. The most recent arrivals are a woman and her two children from the local area. The woman, Zaynab, says she wants to divorce her abusive husband, a drunk, but he has refused. She had gone to live with her mother but he had come to threaten her. “I love my children. My family wanted me to marry again but I don’t want to marry anyone, I want to be with my children.” She stretches her arm out towards the room next door where her curly-haired daughter, eight, and son, seven, are playing.

Sudarsan Raghavan, Iraq’s Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear, WP, December 13, 2007

BAGHDAD — On the first day of class, two male teenagers entered a girls’ high school in the Tobji neighborhood, clutching AK-47 assault rifles. The young Shiite fighters handed the principal a handwritten note and ordered her to assemble the students in the courtyard, witnesses said.

“All girls must wear hijab,” she read aloud, her voice trembling. “If the girls don’t wear hijab, we will close the school or kill the girls.”

That October day Sara Mustafa, 14, a secular Sunni Arab, also trembled. The next morning, she covered up with an Islamic head scarf for the first time. The young fighters now controlled her life. “We could not do anything,” Sara recalled.

The Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is using a new generation of youths, some as young as 15, to expand and tighten its grip across Baghdad, but the ruthlessness of some of these young fighters is alienating Sunnis and Shiites alike.

The fighters are filling the vacuum of leadership created by a 10-month-old U.S.-led security offensive. Hundreds of senior and mid-level militia members have been arrested, killed or forced into hiding, weakening what was once the second most powerful force in Iraq after the U.S. military. But the militia still rules through fear and intimidation, often under the radar of U.S. troops.

The radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ,gestures while delivering Friday sermon, in a Mosque, in Kufa, 160 kilometers, (100 miles) south of Baghdad, Iraq, Friday Sept. 22, 2006. Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has quietly resumed seminary studies to attain the coveted title of a Shiite Ayatollah–a goal that could make him and his Mahdi Army an even more formidable power broker in Iraq. (AP Photo/Alaa Al-Marjani)

Iraq’s Maverick Cleric Hits the Books, AP, December 14, 2007

BAGHDAD (AP) — The leader of Iraq’s biggest Shiite militia movement has quietly resumed seminary studies toward attaining the title of ayatollah — a goal that could make firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army an even more formidable power broker in Iraq.

Al-Sadr’s objectives — described to The Associated Press by close aides — are part of increasingly bitter Shiite-on-Shiite battles for control of Iraq’s southern oil fields, the lucrative pilgrim trade to Shiite holy cities and the nation’s strategic Persian Gulf outlet.

The endgame among Iraq’s majority Shiites also means long-term influence over Iraqi political and financial affairs as the Pentagon and its allies look to scale down their military presence in the coming year.

Al-Sadr’s backers remain main players in the showdowns across the region, where fears of even more bloodshed are rising following Wednesday’s triple car bombing in one of the area’s main urban hubs. At least 25 people were killed and scores wounded.

Daniel Sobelman, Lebanon 2007: Old Realities, New Uncertainties, Strategic Assessment, December 2007, Vol. 10, No. 3

Several events converged to bring twenty-nine years of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon to a finale: the string of political assassinations, the withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanese soil, and of course the Second Lebanon War. The end of this Syrian hegemony also brought to a close what had been an era of domestic stability. Surrounded by regional crises, and with an ever-present threat of civil conflict looming, Lebanon is struggling to recover from the 2006 war and to stem further disintegration. The future status of Hizbollah, at least in the short term, and its political and military room for maneuver will be largely determined by the way in which Lebanon resolves the current crisis.

Internal Strife
In an inconspicuous column entitled “Secrets of the Gods” in late 2003, the Beirut newspaper al-Nahar – at the time the Lebanese newspaper most outspoken in its criticism of Hizbollah – published a one-line item that “one of the prominent organizations” was engaged in digging in towns along the border in order to lay the infrastructure for a private phone system. The report noted that “official and civil authorities” objected to the operations.[1] Four years later, Hizbollah’s operational telephone infrastructure is no longer a guarded secret but rather an openly debated topic on the agenda of the Lebanese government, which in recent months has been exposing and dismantling the Shiite organization’s telephone infrastructure in Beirut and other parts of the country.[2]

Aref Mohammed, Shi’ite factions proclaim truce in Iraq’s Basra, Reuters, December 11, 2007

Rival Shi’ite factions, each with their own militia and political agendas, have vied for control in Basra since 2003.

Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers are thought to have the most clout on the streets, while the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has influence in the security forces and the smaller Fadhila party controls the governorate.

Each has a different view on regional autonomy: Sadr opposes it, the Supreme Council wants Basra as part of a Shi’ite region across the south and Fadhila wants autonomy for Basra itself.

Some of the militia have imposed strict Islamic codes. Women have been killed for so-called “honour crimes” and walls have been painted with threats against those who go out unveiled.

For much of the year, the situation deteriorated. British troops who patrolled Basra came under escalating bombing and mortar attacks until September, when they quit their base in the city centre for the airbase on its outskirts.

Since then, with no more British troops in the city to attack, violence has abated. Many ordinary Basrawis say the city feels safer and government troops appear to be in charge.

“I don’t think there’s any truth to talk of militias ruling Basra. It’s true that sometimes they carry weapons and sometimes spark clashes but the government and its forces are the ones who almost always win,” said university lecturer Wisam Hamid.

Commander Firaiji said most violence was not political.

“We have no militants in the streets, no terrorism in Basra, no crime-infested areas. We still have some organised crime, honour crimes and personal acts of revenge. But politically motivated crimes do not exceed four percent,” he said.

Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Commanders Say Iraqi Police Can Be Reformed - washingtonpost.com, December 11, 2007

U.S. military commanders in Baghdad have concluded that Iraq’s 27,000-member national police force has made progress in weeding out officers involved in sectarian violence and should not be disbanded, countering the judgment of an independent commission that last fall deemed the police corrupt beyond repair and recommended that the force be eliminated.

The Iraqi efforts are “bearing fruit,” said Army Maj. Gen. Michael Jones, commander of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, which advises the Iraqi Interior Ministry. “We have seen a significant change in their performance and behavior. For the most part, they are doing a good job.”

The new assessment follows a classified U.S. military review of Iraq’s Interior Ministry and its security forces completed in late October. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, ordered the review after the commission, led by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, issued a report on Sept. 6 that described the Interior Ministry as dysfunctional and said the police force was “not viable in its current form.”Although U.S. commanders in Iraq acknowledge serious problems within the national police, they said such issues in part reflect larger struggles in Iraqi society and are unlikely to be eliminated by scrapping the police force and starting over. Instead, the Interior Ministry intends to adjust the mission of the national police, gradually withdrawing its forces from neighborhoods and moving them to regional garrisons across the country, where they will serve as an emergency response force, according to Maj. Gen. Michael Jones, who advises Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani. As part of the shift, the force may be consolidated, he said.

Jamie Gumbrecht,  Iraq awaits a fiery Shiite cleric’s next move, McClatchy Washington Bureau | 12/09/2007

BAGHDAD — After Friday prayers in Sadr City, 300 women in black shuffled slowly, quietly down a narrow street toward a billboard-sized photo of Muqtada al Sadr, the fiery young leader of their Shiite Muslim movement. Holding banners and flags, the women protested the U.S. presence in Iraq and the detentions of hundreds of the radical cleric’s followers.

“Anything that comes from Sayed Muqtada is good for us,” said Hannah al Rubaye, using the honorific title for descendents of the prophet Mohammed. “After this step, we expect other orders from Sayed Muqtada. Patience has limits.”

Sadr issued a heated anti-American statement last week, but he instructed his increasingly restless followers not to act. Their demonstration was organized without his orders, and their silence quickly gave way to agitated shouts.

Sadr himself has remained mostly silent since his 60,000-member Mahdi Army militia began a ceasefire three months ago. Sectarian violence and attacks on U.S. forces have dropped as a result, buttressing the case for the withdrawal of some U.S. troops from Iraq and encouraging some to believe that Iraq has had enough of killing.

Now Iraqis and Americans alike are awaiting Sadr’s next move, which could alter both his hold on his own followers and his relations with rival Iraqi leaders and, above all, help to determine whether Iraq is seeing the ebbing of a violent storm or merely the eye of it.

With the U.S. recruiting and arming opposing Sunni volunteer groups, Sadr’s passivity risks alienating his restive followers, the poor and underserved Shiites whose loyalty he inherited from his father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al Sadr.

Nevertheless, said Hazem al Araji, an aide to Sadr, the Mahdi Army ceasefire is likely to extend beyond the planned six months. While this would please U.S. commanders and many Iraqis, it would bolster Sadr only if his followers agree that they’re likely to gain more by keeping their weapons in their closets than they are by pulling them out again.

Sam Dagher, Iraq’s Sadr uses lull to rebuild Army | csmonitor.com, December 11, 2007

Karbala, Iraq - For more than three months, the Mahdi Army has been largely silent. The potent, black-clad Iraqi Shiite force put down its guns in late August at the behest of Moqtada al-Sadr.

The move has bolstered improved security in Baghdad, even though the US says some Mahdi Army splinter groups that it calls “criminals” or “extremists” have not heeded Mr. Sadr’s freeze.

Away from public view, however, Sadr’s top aides say the anti-American cleric is anything but idle. Instead, he is orchestrating a revival among his army of loyalists entrenched in Baghdad and Shiite enclaves to the south – from the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf to the economic hub of Basra. What is in the making, they say, is a better-trained and leaner force free of rogue elements accused of atrocities and crimes during the height of the sectarian war last year.

Many analysts say what may reemerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon’s Hizbullah – a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region.

“He is now in the process of reconstituting the [Mahdi] Army and removing all the bad people that committed mistakes and those that sullied its reputation. There will be a whole new structure and dozens of conditions for membership,” says Sheikh Abdul-Hadi al-Mahamadawi, a turbaned cleric who commands Sadr’s operation in Karbala.