Zakaria: What we need is a political strategy to combat, contest and weaken the appeal of these groups or to marginalize their violent factions
May 18, 2008 2:23 pm War on Terror as Misguided Metaphor, Hezbollah (Hizb Allah), Islamism beyond the ShibbolethsFareed Zakaria, Who’s the Real Appeaser? Newsweek.com, May 17, 2008
The foundation of Hizbullah’s strength is not just its rockets but the support it can command from 1 million Lebanese Shiites. That’s why dealing with the group as a military problem is counterproductive. Augustus Richard Norton, author of the best recent study of Hizbullah, argues that the 2006 war strengthened the group. “I was in Lebanon in late 2007,” he told me. “And Shia families that had been neutral for 20 years now accepted Hizbullah’s argument that the Shia needed the protection it provided.”
The Bush administration’s response to the current setback has again been a military one—promising more arms for the Lebanese Army. But the reason Hizbullah was able to wrest control of so much of Beirut was that the Army sat back and refused to intervene. The Army—which mirrors the diversity of the society—was wary of getting involved in a struggle in which it would likely lose militarily and politically.
It’s not just Hizbullah. In dealing with many such groups—Hamas, the Taliban—the Bush administration has adopted a macho, exclusively military approach. All three of these groups have a political base in their societies that is deep and enduring. Denouncing them as evil and promising to destroy them will not change that; in fact, doing so only adds to their mystique of resistance and struggle. What we need is a political strategy to combat, contest and weaken the appeal of these groups or to marginalize their violent factions. Such a policy would naturally involve some contact with their leaders, but as part of a much broader effort to engage all groups in these societies politically.
