Religion, Nationalism, and Terror

Munson: Retired Lieutenant General William Odem, former head of Army intelligence and director of the National Security Agency under Ronald Reagan, has noted, correctly , that victory in Iraq is simply not an option–for the US at any rate. The Kurds and Shiites have obviously won a great deal, as have the Islamic Republic of Iran and Islamic militants like bin Laden. The war has inflamed public opinion throughout the Sunni Islamic world and thus intensified support for people like Osama bin Laden. It has also greatly increased Iran’s influence in Iraq and helped to create a pro-Iranian Shiite theocracy there.

When American generals and politicians speak of “victory” in Iraq, they presumably mean suppressing the Sunni insurgency and consolidating the government’s power. But that government is controlled by pro-Iranian Shiite clerics and their various militias.

All of this does not mean, however, that the US and its few remaining token allies can simply leave before the Iraqi government is in fact able to govern. As bad as the bloodshed is now, it could be worse. An Iranian once told me that the US should leave Iraq because American public opinion would never allow US troops to do what is necessary to suppress the Sunni insurgency. I asked him if he was advocating the systematic slaughter of tens of thousands of Sunnis. He said, “I am afraid there is no other way.”

As outraged as they are by the presence of American troops in their country, Iraqi Sunnis are also terrified by the thought of what could happen to them once the Americans leave. They know that the current bloody ethnic cleaning could easily become genocide, or “sectocide.” The United States has an obligation to prevent this. So, despite the inevitable gradual reduction in troop levels in the coming years, Americans will continue to die to strengthen a pro-Iran Shiite theocracy while at the same time trying to curb its genocidal impulses.

Such are the consequences of reckless decisions to go to war based on illusions rather than on the careful analysis of possible consequences.

Former Top General in Iraq Faults White House - New York Times, October 12, 2007

In one of his first major public speeches since leaving the Army in late 2006, retired Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez blamed the administration for a “catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan” and denounced the current “surge” strategy as a “desperate” move that will not achieve long-term stability.

“After more than four years of fighting, America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict against extremism,” Mr. Sanchez said, at a gathering here of military reporters and editors.

General Sanchez is the most senior in a string of retired generals to harshly criticize the administration’s conduct of the war. Asked following his remarks why he waited nearly a year after his retirement to outline his views, he responded that that it was not the place of active duty officers to challenge lawful orders from civilian authorities. General Sanchez, who is said to be considering a book, promised further public statements criticizing officials by name.

“There was been a glaring and unfortunate display of incompetent strategic leadership within our national leaders,” he said, adding later in his remarks that civilian officials have been “derelict in their duties” and guilty of a “lust for power.”

The White House had no initial comment.

But his role as commander in Iraq during the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal leaves General Sanchez vulnerable to criticism that that he is shifting the blame from himself and exacting revenge against an administration that replaced him as the top commander in the aftermath of the scandal and declined to nominate him for a fourth star, forcing his retirement.

Though he was cleared of wrongdoing in the abuse matter by an Army investigation, he nonetheless became a symbol, along with officials like L. Paul Bremer III , the chief administrator in Iraq, of the ineffective American leadership early in the occupation.

Questioned by reporters after his speech, he included the military and himself among those who made mistakes in Iraq, citing the failure to insist on a better post-invasion stabilization plan.

But his main criticism was leveled at the Bush administration, which he said he said has failed to mobilize the entire United States government, other than the military, to contribute meaningfully to reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq.

“National leadership continues to believe that victory can be achieved by military power alone,” he said. “Continued manipulations and adjustments to our military strategy will not achieve victory. The best we can do with this flawed approach is stave off defeat.”